We draw upon an organizational learning and adaptation perspective to examine the antecedents and performance consequences of relay CEO successions relative to non-relay inside successions and outside successions. Data on 204 CEO successions in non-diversified U.S. manufacturing firms during the 1993-98 time period show that the likelihood of a relay succession is negatively associated with the number of internal candidates and positively associated with pre-succession firm performance. We also find that relay successions lead to better post-succession firm performance, particularly at lower levels of pre-succession firm performance and at higher levels of post-succession strategic and industry instability.
successions relative to other types of CEO successions. We know even less about how relay successions' performance consequences may vary with key internal and external contingencies.
Extant literature also indicates that in spite of the acknowledged benefits of relay successions a significant proportion of firms do not have any formal succession planning. Brady, Fulmer, and Helmich (1982) , for example, surveyed 1,484 firms and found that fewer than 50% of these firms engaged in succession planning. Indeed, even in cases where heirs apparent have been designated a significant percentage of them may not be promoted to the CEO position (Cannella & Shen, 2001 ). These observations then raise another question: what are the key contextual contingencies, internal and external, that explain the variance in firms' tendencies to adopt a relay succession mode? This gap in the extant literature is consistent with Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1996) general observation that "the factors that determine which of these succession processes will occur have received almost no attention" (p. 175).
In summary, there are both descriptive and normative gaps in the extant succession literature that focuses on relay CEO successions. In order to address these significant gaps, this study attempts to investigate three research questions: (1) how do critical internal and external contingencies influence the likelihood of a relay succession? (2) how do relay CEO successions influence post-succession firm performance relative to other types of CEO successions? and, (3) how do these performance effects vary with key internal and external contingencies? To address these questions, we will take into account the heir apparent experience of the new CEO and divide CEO successions into three categories: (1) relay successions in which the new CEOs were selected from within the firms and were the heirs apparent for the predecessor CEOs, (2) nonrelay inside successions in which the new CEOs were selected from within the firms but were not the heirs apparent for the predecessors, and (3) outside successions in which the new CEOs were selected from outside the firms 1 . Next, we will draw upon an organizational learning and adaptation perspective to develop a theoretical model on the antecedents and performance consequences of relay CEO successions.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

An Organizational Learning and Adaptation View of Relay CEO Successions
CEO succession has been commonly viewed as an important mechanism for organizational learning and adaptation (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . This is because a change in the CEO position can fundamentally alter the knowledge, skills, and interaction processes at the top, and these revised cognitive orientations, skills and communication processes, in turn, can significantly influence the firm's performance in the post-succession era (Virany, Tushman, & Romanelli, 1992) .
Prior research has distinguished between two types of CEO successions-inside vs. outside successions-and has emphasized the role of outside successions in organizational learning and adaptation. However, research evidence consistently indicates that outside new CEOs rarely succeed in their efforts to improve firm performance (Greiner, Cummings, & Bhambri, 2002; Shen & Cannella, 2002a; Wiersema, 2002) . It is plausible that while outside successions may potentially bring in new competencies and skills (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Kesner & Sebora, 1994) , they tend to be disruptive to firms from a process standpoint, and thus the enhanced cognitive repertoire may not get translated into improved firm performance (Grusky, 1963; Greiner et. al., 2002) . Further, the simple distinction between inside and outside successions does not recognize crucial differences between relay and non-relay inside successions, which may have different implications for organizational learning and adaptation.
In this study, we focus on an important type of CEO succession-namely, relay succession-and compare it with non-relay inside successions and outside successions. In a relay succession, a firm identifies an heir apparent well in advance of the actual succession event and uses the time interval between designation and promotion to "groom" the heir apparent for the top job (Vancil, 1987) . A completed relay CEO succession process consists of two phases: the first phase, during which the firm decides whether or not to designate an heir apparent, and the second phase (the "grooming" phase), in which a firm decides whether or not to promote the heir apparent to the CEO position. Both phases offer significant opportunities for organizational learning and adaptation. In the first phase, learning and adaptation primarily occur at the firm level. The firm assesses the availability and desirability of various candidates for the CEO position and evaluates the qualifications of these potential candidates in light of key internal and external contingencies in order to decide whether to designate one of them as the heir apparent.
The second phase can be characterized as a two-way learning and adaptation process that occurs at both the individual level of the heir apparent and at the firm level. At the individual level, the heir apparent now has the direct opportunity to carry out some of the tasks of the CEO position and thereby to acquire and enhance his or her CEO position-specific knowledge, as well as to develop broader leadership skills consistent with the position (Vancil, 1987) . Meanwhile, at the firm level, because one of the candidates has been designated as the heir apparent, the firm can now conduct a more focused assessment of this particular candidate's capabilities (cognitive and interpersonal) and continuously update its evaluation of whether the candidate's capabilities fit the CEO position. It can then use this evaluation to subsequently decide whether or not to promote the heir apparent. In this sense, the grooming phase is also a probation period for the heir apparent.
inside and outside successions, thus providing a complete empirical treatment of the major succession alternatives.
To summarize, a relay succession is not only a process in which the heir can learn CEO position-specific skills but also one in which the firm can learn about the heir's cognitive and interpersonal skills and how these skills fit the firm's contingencies. Thus, the chance of mismatch between the new CEO and the firm's strategic context should be lower in relay successions than in other types of successions, which should have a positive impact on firm performance in the post-succession period.
Further, from an organizational learning and adaptation standpoint, the positive performance effects of relay successions should be particularly strong in challenging circumstances such as poor firm performance and/or high strategic and industry instability. It has been well noted in the broader organizational adaptation literature that simultaneous changes in multiple organizational processes can be detrimental to both performance and survival (Barnett & Carroll, 1995; Virany et al., 1992) . Hannan and Freeman (1984) argued that extensive changes in structures and routines throughout the organization are precarious and lead to an elevated probability of organizational failure and death. Empirically, Haveman (1992) and Sastry (1997) provided strong evidence that organizational change leads to better performance and enhanced survival if it builds on established routines and competencies. To the extent that relay successions build on established organizational rules and routines (Ocasio, 1999) , they can reduce organizational disruption and enhance the ability of the firm to better manage ongoing strategic and industry instability and turn around poor firm performance. We will elaborate on these general learning and adaptation-based theoretical arguments in the following sections in order to develop specific hypotheses on the antecedents and performance consequences of relay successions.
Antecedents of Relay CEO Successions
As noted earlier, organizational learning and adaptation can occur during the two phases of a relay succession (the phase prior to the designation of an heir and the grooming phase). Using the prior succession literature and the broader organizational learning and adaptation literature, we identified four major antecedents that can influence the likelihood of relay successions. These are (1) the number of internal candidates, (2) pre-succession firm performance, (3) presuccession strategic instability, and (4) pre-succession industry instability. While the number of internal candidates represents the availability of internal candidates for the CEO position, the other three internal and external contingencies affect the desirability of different types of candidates for the CEO position (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) .
Number of internal candidates. In CEO successions, the most visible and readily available candidates are those within the firm. In this study, internal candidates were defined as those current senior executives (other than the incumbent CEO) who have the position of executive vice president (EVP) or higher (O'Reilly, Main, & Crystal, 1988) . These executives can be considered viable contenders for the CEO position for three reasons. First, requirements of the CEO position are substantially different from other organizational positions (Kesner & Sebora, 1994: 329) . Because this is a position with considerable responsibility for overall firm performance, only a small group of executives with experience at the highest levels of the firm are likely to possess the relevant managerial skills and expertise to make them serious candidates for the position (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Ocasio, 1999) . Second, in order to qualify for consideration, internal candidates need to have an established power base, especially in relation to the incumbent CEO and the board of directors (Ocasio, 1999) . Such a power base is often evident in formal job titles such as EVP (Finkelstein, 1992) . Finally, candidates are more likely to be considered seriously for the CEO position if incumbent CEOs and outside directors have relevant information about the candidate's skills and competencies (Zajac, 1990) . Senior executives have significant opportunities to interact with the incumbent CEO and outside directors through co-working experiences and boardroom presentations, which allow them to convey such information (Lorcsh & MacIver, 1989; Vancil, 1987) .
From an organizational learning and adaptation perspective, the larger the number of internal candidates, the more complex will be the task of assessing the fit between an individual executive's human capital and key organizational contingencies. Such assessment is often very difficult because several senior executives may share certain responsibilities. These senior executives also share power and possibly have working and personal relationships with outside directors on the board, so that it is hard for one of them to stand out as the most desirable candidate for the CEO position. In such a situation, hence, the firm will be less likely to designate one of them as an heir apparent.
In addition, even when one candidate from a larger pool of internal candidates is designated as the heir apparent, the firm can use an ongoing assessment of the other candidates' evolving capabilities to update its relative evaluation of the heir apparent. Such updating is then likely to raise the bar for the heir and reduce the probability of successfully meeting evaluation criteria during the grooming period. Indeed, it may turn out that other senior executives are perceived as more qualified than the heir when succession eventually occurs. Thus, the chance that the heir will get promoted to the CEO position is also reduced. In other words, if multiple internal candidates are available firms will be less likely to designate one of them as the heir apparent, and the likelihood of heir promotion will also be reduced. Instead, firms will wait to select a new CEO till the time of actual succession. Therefore we proposed, Hypothesis 1: The number of internal candidates will be negatively related to the likelihood of a relay CEO succession.
Internal and external contingencies. From an organizational learning and adaptation perspective, as internal and external organizational contingencies become unstable, the appropriateness of alternative candidates' human capital becomes more difficult to assess. These changing conditions make the CEO selection process more challenging because cause-effect relationships are more difficult to evaluate. Hence, under unstable organizational conditions, the firm is less likely to designate an heir apparent and is more likely to wait, because waiting provides the firm with increased opportunities to update its knowledge on both the capabilities of various candidates and the operating context of the firm. In addition, even if an heir apparent is designated, these changing conditions can increase the chance that the heir will not be promoted. This is because under changing conditions new knowledge is continuously incorporated and current knowledge becomes outdated at a more rapid pace. Thus, an heir designated early in the process may not be considered the best candidate available when actual succession occurs. In other words, unstable conditions argue against both the designation of an heir apparent and the subsequent promotion of the heir to the CEO position. Instead, the firm tends to wait to select the new CEO in order to increase the time available to learn about both the evolving contingencies and the alternative candidates' human capital and how their skills and knowledge bases may best meet the needs of the firm's emerging contingencies.
Pre-succession firm performance. Firm performance has consistently been found to be an important determinant of CEO turnover and dismissal and new CEO selection (e.g., Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988; Ocasio, 1994) . We argue that good firm performance tends to lead to a relay succession while poor firm performance tends to discourage it. First, given the overlap between the heir's tenure and the incumbent's tenure, there is a possibility that the heir can be influenced by the incumbent CEO and tends to preserve the incumbent's vision for the firm after assuming the top position (Zajac & Westphal, 1996) . Such continuity is devalued when poor firm performance highlights the inappropriateness of the status quo (Kimberly & Quinn, 1984) . As a result, when performance is poor, firms will tend to not designate an heir apparent. Consistent with this argument, Zajac (1990) found that firm performance is negatively related to relay CEO succession planning.
In addition, even if an heir apparent is designated, if performance is poor, investors and outside directors may question the capabilities of the entire top management team (including the heir) rather than just the capabilities of the CEO (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993) . In such a situation, the heir may be passed over for the CEO position. In support of this argument, Shen and Cannella (2003) found that the stock market reacts positively to heir promotion if pre-succession firm performance is good. Overall, then, poor firm performance will discourage both the designation of an heir apparent and the promotion of the heir to the CEO position, while good performance will have the opposite effects. Therefore, we proposed the next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Pre-succession firm performance will be positively related to the likelihood of a relay CEO succession.
Pre-succession strategic instability. Firm strategic instability 2 refers to the extent to which a firm's strategy has changed over time. Under conditions of high strategic instability, the cause-effect relationship between strategy and firm performance tends to be ambiguous (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) . As an extension of this argument, the qualifications desired in the next CEO may also not be clear, given that the future strategy may be expected to differ from current strategy. Because of instability in strategy, the firm's prior experience in CEO selection decisions may not provide reliable information. In such situations, firms tend to have a poor understanding of the qualifications considered most appropriate in the new CEO. Thus, firms tend not to name an heir apparent in order to postpone the selection of a new CEO and to be able to apply the most current criteria at the time of selection (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) . Also, even if an heir is designated, the selection criteria may change at the time of succession because of the high level of strategic instability, which reduces the chance that the heir will be promoted.
In contrast, under conditions of low strategic instability, the qualifications needed in the next CEO can be anticipated well in advance. Thus, the potential risk to the firm in committing to a wrong heir apparent is quite low. Consistent with our reasoning, in discussing alternative processes for CEO succession Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996: 177) also argued that the more stable the firm's strategic situation the earlier and the more likely an heir apparent will be designated. In addition, under relatively stable conditions, once an heir is designated, he or she is very likely to be promoted because the selection criteria probably will not change much during the grooming period. In general, a high level of strategic instability will lead to a low likelihood of relay succession. Under such conditions, a firm is more likely to wait, to continue evaluating potential candidates as they are experimenting with diverse new strategies, and to finally choose as the new CEO the candidate whose capabilities and performance are best adapted to the firm's contingencies at the time of succession. Based on these arguments, we proposed that, Hypothesis 3: Pre-succession strategic instability will be negatively related to the likelihood of a relay CEO succession.
Pre-succession industry instability. Previous studies have found evidence that industry conditions explain significant variance in the origin of new CEOs (Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; Parrino; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) . In this study, we examined the impact of industry instability, defined as the level of unpredictability of changes in industry-specific factors over time (Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991) . Firms operating in stable industries rely on established routines because little adjustment is required (Eisenhardt, 1989) . In such industries, firms tend to legitimate and enforce the current systems and core values and to manage symbolically (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) . Because relay successions often represent organizational rules and routines (Ocasio, 1999) , they are likely to occur under relatively more stable industry conditions.
In contrast, unstable industry environments require managers to continuously adapt their perceptions of the industry to accommodate evolving realities (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) .
Previous studies have found that industry instability can trigger turnover of the incumbent CEO and turnover in the executive team (Keck & Tushman, 1993; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) . Similarly, industry instability should discourage firms from adopting a relay succession because, when industry conditions are constantly changing, the preferred characteristics in the next CEO are less clear (Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996) . Consistent with this argument, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) argued that the more unstable an industry, the later and the less likely that an heir apparent will be designated. This may be because firms tend to wait to select the new CEO in order to increase the time available to learn about the changing industry conditions. Accordingly, we predicted as follows.
Hypothesis 4: Pre-succession industry instability will be negatively related to the likelihood of a relay CEO succession.
Performance Consequences of Relay CEO Successions
The arguments used to motivate the preceding four hypotheses (H1-H4) are based on a descriptive theory of the antecedents to relay successions. We will now develop more normative predictions that focus on the performance consequences of relay successions. Based on the heir's and the firm's learning and adaptation experiences in the pre-succession period, we argue that
In addition, during the grooming phase, the heir also has opportunities to learn how to manage relationships with both internal and external key stakeholders (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Vancil, 1987) . Managing internal stakeholders is crucial for building a credible power base and obtaining the support of the top management team, both of which are essential for implementing strategic initiatives in the future (Greiner et al., 2002) . In contrast, infighting and power plays that are not effectively resolved are likely to distract the firm from more important adaptations (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988 ). An heir successor is likely to have frequent interactions with other senior executives before assuming the CEO position and is hence more likely than other types of successors to gain the support from key internal constituencies that will be valuable assets in the post-succession period. Further, an heir is also well positioned to engage in strategically important interactions with key external stakeholders during the grooming period, either as a participant in CEO-initiated interactions or as a substitute for the CEO when he or she is unable to participate due to conflicting priorities. These externally oriented interactions (with customers, suppliers, regulatory institutions, etc.) help the heir develop valuable knowledge and insights about external stakeholders and about how they potentially affect firm performance (Vancil, 1987) .
From the point of view of the firm's learning experience, we have already argued that the risk of mismatch between the new CEO and the firm's CEO position should be reduced in relay successions relative to other types of successions, which should also have a positive impact on post-succession firm performance. Prior literature has also noted that, in general, inside successions (both relay and non-relay) have a lower risk of mismatch than outside successions because the boards of directors have more knowledge about internal successors' competencies (Shen & Cannella, 2002a; Zajac, 1990) . The risk of mismatch should be reduced even further in relay successions relative to non-relay inside successions. Recall that requirements of the CEO position are substantially different from other organizational positions (Kesner & Sebora, 1994: 329), even other senior executive positions in the firm. Because of that, internal candidates' performance in their prior positions may not be reliable indicators of their plausible performance in the CEO position. In a relay succession, the firm can conduct a more focused and comprehensive evaluation of the heir apparent's competencies during the grooming period.
Consistent with these arguments, Zajac (1990) found that firms with relay CEO succession planning had better post-succession performance than others. Similarly, Shen and Cannella (2003) found that stock markets react positively when an heir is promoted to the CEO position.
These arguments and research evidence motivated the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: Relay CEO succession will be positively related to post-succession firm performance.
Prior literature indicates that the performance consequences of CEO successions vary across contexts (Kesner & Sebora, 1994) . We draw upon this literature to argue that the heir successor's learning experience is particularly important under conditions of poor pre-succession firm performance and/or high post-succession strategic and industry instability. These contingencies increase the complexity of the learning tasks that confront the new CEO and increase both the cognitive and interpersonal capabilities required of the new CEO. The presuccession learning experience acquired during the grooming phase is likely to equip the heir successor with the skills necessary to cope better with these challenges. In contrast, in relatively more stable circumstances, because the learning needs are less complex, the new CEO's heir apparent experience may not be that valuable.
The moderating effect of pre-succession firm performance. It has been argued that outside successors are better positioned to effect performance turnarounds because they often bring in fresh perspectives and new skills and because they are more willing to question existing practices and initiate major changes (Kesner & Sebora, 1994) . However, several recent studies have found that outside CEOs are generally unable to have positive effects on firm performance (e.g., Greiner et al., 2002; Shen & Cannella, 2002a; Wiersema, 2002) . It is likely that the disruptive process of outside succession and the organizational turmoil it often engenders can hinder quick turnaround in the post-succession period. Outsiders are also less familiar with the organization's particular routines and competencies and thus are more likely to either ignore or even challenge these competencies.
The broader organizational adaptation literature has suggested that changes that build on existing competencies are more likely to enhance performance than changes that require entirely new competencies (Haveman, 1992; Sastry, 1997) . Such competence-protecting or competenceenhancing changes are more likely to be initiated by inside successors who have a better understanding of the organization's resources and constraints. In particular, the grooming period provides heir successors with added opportunities to learn what does and does not work at the uppermost levels of the firm.
In addition, we have argued that an heir successor is more capable of garnering the support of the top management team within the firm. Internal support is crucial for the new CEO to turn around performance. In contrast, infighting and power plays within the top management team are likely to distract the firm from more critical adaptations in the post-succession period.
Unfortunately, both non-relay inside successions and outside successions may suffer from problems of power and politics under conditions of poor performance. First, poor firm performance feeds power struggles and political fighting at the top of an organization (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988 Second, studies have shown that outside successions are usually accompanied by frustration and resistance from inside executives (Greiner et al., 2002) . Outside successions also lead to a higher level of senior executive turnover than inside successions (Friedman & Saul, 1991) . A high level of senior executive turnover can deprive the outside successors of valuable managerial talents and firm-specific knowledge that they dearly need, especially during the transition period (Shen & Cannella, 2002a) . Even those senior executives who remain in the firm may be hostile to the outside successor and so may not fully support the outside successor's change initiatives (Boeker & Goodstein, 1993) . Further, we have earlier argued that in a relay succession the new CEO gets time before the succession occurs to build relationships with external stakeholders. Confidence and support from the external stakeholders are also vital for a new CEO in his or her efforts to turn around performance (Greiner et. al., 2002) . Therefore, we
proposed that, Hypothesis 6: The positive relationship between relay CEO succession and postsuccession firm performance will be stronger at lower levels of pre-succession firm performance.
The moderating effects of post-succession strategic and industry instability. The performance consequences of relay successions can also vary depending upon the instability in firm strategy and industry conditions in the post-succession period. Hannan and Freeman's (1984) structural inertia theory suggests that a high level of instability in firm strategy and/or its industry conditions can reduce firm accountability and thus increase the probability of firm failure and mortality. Instability in firm strategy and the firm's industry conditions often place tremendous cognitive demands upon CEOs. For example, industry instability requires that CEOs continuously adapt their perceptions of the industry to fit the current reality (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) . Strategic instability requires that CEOs both continuously adapt resource allocations in order to better implement strategies and come up with a new strategy for the future. Under changing strategic and industry conditions, cause-effect relationships are also more difficult to evaluate, and knowledge tends to become outdated relatively quickly. These cognitive challenges further increase the burden on new CEOs who are trying to learn the skills and routines particular to the CEO position even as they are developing an understanding of changing internal and external conditions. Given the costs and risks of managing these internal and external instabilities, links to the prior convergent period can be significant sources of stability for the new CEO (Virany et al., 1992) . In this sense, heir successors should be more capable of managing these instabilities than other successors because they have had more time and greater opportunity to develop knowledge and skills that are specific to the CEO position of this particular firm and to gain support from internal and external key constituents during the grooming period. These arguments led us to the final two research hypotheses, as follows.
Hypothesis 7: The positive relationship between relay CEO succession and postsuccession firm performance will be stronger at higher levels of post-succession strategic instability.
Hypothesis 8: The positive relationship between relay CEO succession and postsuccession firm performance will be stronger at higher levels of post-succession industry instability.
METHODS
Sample Selection
The sample for this study was drawn from the population of relatively large (annual sales revenue greater than $100 million), publicly traded, U.S. non-diversified (the firm had to derive at least 70% of its sales from a single 4-digit industry) manufacturing firms listed continuously on COMPUSTAT between 1993 and 1998 (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003 
Measures
We classified CEO successions in this sample into three categories. First, a relay CEO succession refers to a succession in which the new CEO was an executive of the firm who had firm tenure of at least two years at the time of succession and was the heir apparent to the predecessor CEO. Second, a non-relay inside succession refers to one in which the new CEO was an executive of the firm who had firm tenure of at least two years at the time of succession but was not the heir apparent to the predecessor CEO. Third, an outside succession is one in which the new CEO had firm tenure of less than two years at the time of succession. In this operationalization, it is important to identify the heir apparent status of the new CEO. Cannella and Shen (2001: 258) defined an heir apparent as "any officer who was the only person in the firm holding the title of president or COO or both and who was at least five years younger than the incumbent CEO." In our sample (non-diversified manufacturing firms), we did not observe any firm that had more than one person holding the title of president and/or COO. We also examined tenure outcomes of people with the president/COO title: 80% of them (irrespective of age) were promoted to the CEO position and 84% of those who were at least five years younger than the incumbent CEOs were promoted. These ratios did not significantly differ and suggested that the "5-years younger than the incumbent CEO" was not a relevant criterion for defining an heir apparent in our sample. Thus, we identified that a new CEO used to be an heir apparent if he or she had had the title of president or COO or both before the succession occurred. Our operational definition is also consistent with the recent work of Bigley and Wiersema (2002) .
Among the 204 CEO successions, there were 75 relay successions, 53 non-relay inside successions and 76 outside successions. There were three successions in which the new CEOs were brought in from outside the firm as COO and/or president within two years prior to succession (so they had firm tenure of less than two years). We coded these successions as outside successions rather than relay successions 3 . Two dummy variables were then created:
relay succession was coded 1 if a succession was a relay succession and 0 otherwise; outside succession was coded 1 if a succession was an outside succession and 0 otherwise. statements. Pre-succession firm performance was measured using three performance dimensions:
return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and market value/book value of shareholders' equity (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) . We first calculated the average for the three years prior to succession for each of the three dimensions, and then we standardized them within the sample (mean = 0, standard deviation = 1). The average of the three standardized dimensions yielded a composite measure of pre-succession firm performance. Post-succession firm performance was measured following the same procedure but using corresponding data for the three years after the succession occurred.
We measured pre-succession strategic instability following Finkelstein and Hambrick's (1990) measurement of strategic persistence, which captures the absence of variance in strategy over time and is conceptually opposite to our concept of strategic instability. Six strategic dimensions were used: (1) advertising intensity (advertising/sales), (2) research and development intensity (R&D/sales), (3) plant and equipment newness (net P&E/gross P&E), (4) nonproduction overhead (selling, general, and administrative [SGA] expenses/sales), (5) inventory levels (inventories/sales), and (6) financial leverage (debt/equity). We first computed a firm's pre-succession three-year variance (Σ(ti -T)/n-1) for each strategic dimension. Next, we standardized variance scores for each dimension within the sample, and the average of the six standardized dimensions yielded a composite measure of pre-succession strategic instability.
Post-succession strategic instability was measured following the same procedure but using corresponding data for the three years after the succession occurred.
We followed Dess and Beard (1984) in measuring pre-succession industry instability as a composite of instability in sales growth and employment growth in an industry at the 4-digit SIC level. First, we calculated instability in industry sales as the standard errors of the regression slope coefficient (S b1 ) divided by the mean value of sales in the three years prior to succession.
Then we calculated instability in industry employment following the same procedure. These two dimensions were standardized within the sample, and their average was used to operationalize pre-succession industry instability. Post-succession industry instability was measured following the same procedure but using corresponding data for the three years after the succession. Data for firm performance and strategic and industry instability were all gathered from COMPUSTAT.
Control Variables
In modeling the antecedents of relay successions, we included the following control variables. First, pre-succession firm size was operationalized as the natural logarithm of the average sales for the three years prior to succession (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998) . Second, because the departing CEO's age has been found to be crucial in the succession process (Cannella & Shen, 2001; Vancil, 1987) , we controlled for departing CEO age (the years since the CEO was born at the time of succession). Third, as in previous studies of CEO origin (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Harris & Helfat, 1997; Ocasio, 1999) , we controlled for departing CEO origin, coded 1 if the departing CEO was an outside CEO (with firm tenure of less than two years when assuming the CEO position) and 0 otherwise.
Fourth, power has been found to be important in determining CEO succession and heir apparent tenure outcomes (e.g., Cannella & Shen, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 1996) . Following Zajac and Westphal (1996) , we created an index of pre-succession relative board power as follows. We first calculated the percentage of outside directors, the proportion of the firm's outstanding shares owned by outside directors, and board tenure relative to CEO tenure (the average tenure of a firm's directors divided by its CEO's tenure). We then standardized them and summed them into a single measure. Fifth, although CEO duality (the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors) has been used as an indicator of power in the literature, we observed that most CEOs assumed the chairman position before they had an heir apparent. This may represent an organizational routine. Thus, rather than including CEO duality in the index of relative board power, we included a control variable of departing CEO duality, coded 1 if the departing CEO was also the board chair when he or she left the CEO position, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, the circumstance in which the departing CEO left the CEO position (voluntary turnover versus dismissal) has been found to influence the selection of the new CEO (e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993 ), so we controlled for CEO dismissal. Following Shen and Cannella (2002b : 1198 -1199 , we used two approaches to identify CEO dismissal. The first relied on news reports (from the year before to the year after the succession, from Dow Jones databases), and the second relied on CEO age and continuity as a board member at the time of succession (a CEO was considered to be dismissed if he or she terminated his or her service as both CEO and board member before the age of 64 for reasons other than death, health, acceptance of a similar position at another firm, or the occurrence of a merger or acquisition). CEO dismissal was coded 1 if both approaches suggested that the departing CEO was dismissed, and 0 otherwise.
In modeling the performance consequences of relay successions, we controlled for postsuccession firm size (similar to pre-succession firm size but for the three years following the succession), CEO dismissal, number of internal candidates, and post-succession relative board power (board power relative to the new CEO). We also controlled for post-succession industry performance measured as the average performance (a composite measure of ROA, ROS, and market value/book value ratio as in post-succession firm performance) of firms in the 4-digit industry in the three years after the succession. In addition, the main effects of pre-succession firm performance, post-succession strategic instability, and post-succession industry instability were also controlled for. Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all the variables used in this study. Table 2 presents results on the antecedent model (Hypotheses 1-4) . Because the dependent variable had three categories (relay succession, non-relay inside succession, and outside succession), we used multinomial logit analyses (Parrino, 1997; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) . We used this methodology to simultaneously estimate the likelihood of relay succession and that of outside succession against the base category of non-relay inside succession. Two models were estimated. Model A only included control variables, and Model B added the four main effects: the number of internal candidates, pre-succession firm performance, pre-succession strategic instability, and pre-succession industry instability. The pseudo R-squares of the two models were 0.15 and 0.22, and the change in pseudo R-square was 0.07 (p < .001).
DATA ANALYSES AND RESULTS
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about Although the correlation matrix in Table 1 showed that pre-succession strategic instability was negatively related to relay succession (r = -0.21, p < .01) and positively related to outside succession (r = 0.29, p < .01), the multinomial results showed that pre-succession strategic instability is not significantly related to the likelihood of a relay succession (b = -0.35, n.s.).
Hence, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. In addition, our results did not support Hypothesis 4, which predicted that pre-succession industry instability (b = -0.02, n.s.) would be negatively related to the likelihood of a relay succession. Table 3 presents the results of the OLS models on the performance consequences of relay successions (Hypotheses 5-8). Six models were estimated. Model 1 included only the controls, and Model 2 added the main effects of relay succession and outside succession. Models 3 to 5 added their interactions with pre-succession firm performance, post-succession strategic instability, and post-succession industry instability, respectively. Finally, Model 6 included all interaction effects simultaneously. To create these interaction terms, both independent and moderating variables were mean-centered to address the potential problem of multicollinearity (Aiken & West, 1991) . R-square for these models ranged from 0.35 to 0.47 (p < .001). Results did not change significantly across different model specifications, which suggested that our findings were quite robust. Hence, we tested our hypotheses based on the results of Model 6, the most complete model specification.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In support of Hypothesis 5, we found that relay succession was positively related to postsuccession firm performance (b = 0.31, p < .001). Hypothesis 6 proposed that the positive effect of relay succession on post-succession firm performance would be stronger at lower levels of pre-succession firm performance. This hypothesis was supported because the coefficient for the interaction of relay succession and pre-succession firm performance was negative and significant (b = -0.36, p < .01). To facilitate interpretation, we have plotted these results in Figure 1 . To create the figure, all of the variables in Model 6 in Table 3 except relay succession (and outside succession) and pre-succession firm performance were constrained to their mean values (Cannella & Shen, 2001) . In addition, results showed that outside succession and non-relay inside succession did not differ in terms of their effects on post-succession firm performance (b = 0.01, n.s.). However, outside successions led to better post-succession firm performance than non-relay inside successions at higher levels of post-succession industry instability (b = 0.23, p < .05).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
There is an emerging research stream in the CEO succession literature that specifically focuses on relay CEO successions (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Cannella & Shen, 2001; Shen & Cannella, 2003; Vancil, 1987) . In order to better understand the antecedents and performance consequences of relay CEO successions, we distinguished between three types of CEO successions: relay successions, non-relay inside successions, and outside successions. We empirically investigated the following three research questions. Overall, these results indicate the usefulness of an organizational adaptation and learning perspective for understanding the succession phenomenon.
Antecedents of Relay CEO Successions
Our results suggest that as the number of internal candidates increases, both the likelihood of relay successions and the likelihood of outside successions decline, relative to non-relay inside successions. It seems that as a firm has more internal candidates for the CEO position it tends to select an inside new CEO without designating him or her as the heir. These results shed new light on previous findings that the availability of internal candidates increases the likelihood of inside succession (e.g., Dalton & Kesner, 1983; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) . While previous studies did not differentiate between the two different types of inside successions, our study clearly distinguishes between relay (inside) successions and non-relay inside successions and thus provides additional evidence on how inside CEOs are selected. Our results suggest that if a firm has multiple inside candidates for the CEO position it is less likely to designate and groom one of them as the heir apparent for the CEO position. Instead, the firm tends to wait to select a new CEO until the time of actual succession.
We also found that high levels of pre-succession firm performance increase the likelihood of relay successions and decrease the likelihood of outside successions, relative to non-relay inside successions. These results are consistent with previous findings that high levels of presuccession firm performance increase the likelihood of inside successions relative to outside successions (Kesner & Sebora, 1994) . Further, because we differentiated between relay and nonrelay inside successions, our study provides evidence on how performance influences the process a firm uses to select an inside new CEO. Under conditions of good performance, a firm is likely to designate an heir apparent and groom him or her for the CEO position (Zajac, 1990) .
Throughout the grooming period, the heir likely continues to be viewed favorably and thus is likely to be promoted to the CEO position when the incumbent CEO leaves office. In contrast, under conditions of poor performance, a firm is less likely to adopt a relay succession.
Overall, our results suggest that in deciding whether or not to use relay CEO successions firms are guided by adaptive criteria. They consider the availability of internal candidates for the CEO position and use the ongoing firm performance to evaluate the competencies of these candidates (including that of the heir apparent). By distinguishing between relay and non-relay inside successions, our study suggests that the firm's internal conditions (i.e., number of internal candidates and pre-succession firm performance) influence the choice of alternative inside succession processes. Because we also controlled for various factors that represent power and politics (e.g., Cannella & Shen, 2001) , we believe that our results offer compelling evidence in support of a learning and adaptive view of relay CEO successions.
Performance Consequences of Relay CEO Successions
In comparing post-succession firm performance following different types of CEO successions, we found that relay successions contributed to better post-succession firm performance than non-relay inside successions and outside successions. Further, non-relay inside successions and outside successions did not differ in terms of their effects upon post-succession firm performance. These findings thus highlight the value of the new CEO's learning experience (i.e., in relay succession) before he or she assumes the CEO position. Our results may also help to reconcile the inconsistent findings in prior literature on the performance impact of new CEO origin (in terms of insiders versus outsiders) (for a review, see Kesner & Sebora, 1994) . A plausible reason is that this simple distinction does not capture the important differences between different types of insider CEOs.
Our study is among the few studies that differentiate between different types of inside successions. In a recent study, Shen and Cannella (2002a) distinguished between follower inside successions (inside CEO successions following voluntary turnover of the predecessor CEOs) and contender inside successions (inside CEO successions following dismissal of the predecessor CEOs). They found limited differences in post-succession firm performance across these two types of inside successions. It is possible that the learning experience of the new CEO (reflected in the heir's grooming period) explains more variance in post-succession performance than the circumstances of the predecessor CEO's departure (examined in their study). Taken together, these studies highlight the need to adopt a finer-grained classification of inside successions in order to achieve a better understanding of their performance effects.
Our study also examined how the performance consequences of relay successions can be moderated by key internal and external contingencies. Consistent with theory, we found that the positive performance effect of relay successions was particularly strong under conditions of lower pre-succession firm performance, higher post-succession strategic instability, and higher post-succession industry instability. These three contingencies can be viewed as presenting "challenging" succession scenarios for the new CEO. Declining firm performance places the new CEO under immediate performance pressure. Unstable strategic and industry conditions cause added cognitive demands, in that knowledge has to be constantly updated, and may also increase the likelihood of internal dissension and disagreement on strategic choices. It is likely that the learning benefits conferred by the grooming period (i.e., the opportunity to develop competencies that are specific to the CEO position of this particular firm and relationships with key internal and external key constituencies) are particularly significant and may yield positive dividends under these challenging succession circumstances. In contrast, in relatively easy or less challenging succession circumstances (such as good pre-succession firm performance and low post-succession strategic and industry instability) most new CEOs can probably do quite well, and their prior learning experiences may not confer any particular advantages. These findings are also consistent with the broader research stream in the area of strategic leadership (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) , which suggests that leadership at the top matters more when the going gets tough because the scope for and impact of managerial discretion are particularly significant in such contexts.
The normative implications of our findings are also quite significant because they may help us to understand why so many new CEOs fail to influence firm performance positively. As Greiner and colleagues (2002) recently noted, "given the many pitfalls awaiting new CEOs, as well as their high failure rate, we need to ask ourselves if there is any way to better prepare them for the job. We are not aware of a 'school for CEOs' but there should be one" (p. 15). Our results suggest that the grooming period in a relay succession may offer an opportunity to both the firm and the heir to learn about each other and about key internal and external contingencies, so that there is an increased chance of an appropriate choice at the time of succession and of better firm performance in the post-succession period. Thus, the grooming period may be akin to the "school" within which the new CEO's education takes place. In contrast, without the grooming period the education is likely to take place after succession and impose higher costs on the firm.
Contrary to the traditional wisdom that outside CEOs are better equipped to turn around poor performance, our results suggest that outside successions do not significantly differ from non-relay inside successions in terms of post-succession firm performance, even under conditions of poor pre-succession firm performance and/or high post-succession strategic instability. Outside successors are usually prized for their new skills and perspectives, and their willingness to initiate changes (Harris & Helfat, 1997) . Indeed, it has been well noted in the literature that relative to inside CEOs, outside CEOs are more likely to initiate strategic changes (e.g., Helmich & Brown, 1972; Wiersema, 1995) . Most often, though, previous studies have focused upon the impact of outside CEOs on strategic change rather than on the performance consequences of strategic change. The finding that outside CEOs are more likely to initiate strategic change, does not lead to the conclusion that such change will result in better postsuccession firm performance. Indeed, because outside successors are more likely to lack firmspecific knowledge, it is harder for them to formulate and implement appropriate strategic change (Greiner et al., 2002) . In addition, outside CEO successions are often disruptive to firms and outside successors find it more challenging to get support from other senior executives within the firm. Therefore, it is not surprising that outside successions may not lead to better firm performance in the post-succession era (Shen & Cannella, 2002; Wiersema, 2002) .
However, we did find that at higher levels of post-succession industry instability, outside successions were associated with better post-succession performance than non-relay inside successions. Perhaps unstable industry conditions necessitate the introduction of significantly different competencies and in these contexts the potential benefits of outsiders' novel strategic approaches may outweigh the costs of organizational disruption (Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996) .
In conclusion, we would like to acknowledge some limitations of our study that, in turn, suggest interesting avenues for future research. First, like most research on CEO succession, our study relied on archival data rather than direct observations of the succession process. For example, we relied on formal titles of "president" and/or "COO" to identify the heir apparent status of the new CEO. Future research that uses survey data or field studies may be able to identify heirs apparent who do not have such formal titles.
Second, while in this study we treated outside successors as homogenous, future research can benefit from adopting a finer-grained classification of outside successions (e.g., Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003) . From an organizational learning and adaptation perspective, the backgrounds of outside successors may influence the extent to which they are prepared for the CEO position. For example, outside successors with prior general management experience (e.g., outsiders who have previously been CEOs/Presidents/COOs/divisional heads) may be better prepared for the challenges of a CEO position than outside successors with narrower, more function-specific experience.
Third, although empirically we simultaneously compared the antecedents and performance consequences of all three types of CEO successions, our theoretical arguments focused mainly on relay successions. Hence, there is an opportunity for future work to extend our theoretical model and to develop arguments that explicitly compare the antecedents and consequences of non-relay successions.
Fourth, although the nature of the sample used in our study (relatively large, nondiversified manufacturing firms) enabled us to identify fairly clearly the heir apparent status of the new CEO and to explicitly measure strategic instability and industry instability, the sample may also have limited the generalizability of the findings to other contexts (e.g., diversified firms). Future research needs to refine and extend our theoretical arguments to other contexts in order to build a more generalizable theory of CEO succession.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to simultaneously examine both the antecedents and performance consequences of relay CEO successions, relative to non-relay inside successions and outside successions. We hope that our findings contribute toward a more completely specified descriptive and normative theory of relay CEO successions. Significance levels: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, † p < .10 (two-tailed tests). a In supplementary analyses, we also controlled for departing CEO's tenure, new CEO age, and new CEO duality, and the results did not change. b Change in R-Square is relative to Model 1. c Change in R-Square is relative to Model 2. 
